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IN THE SUP·REME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FINLEY BRIGGS, STRATFORD
WENDELBOE,R.G.APGOOD,
RODNEY BUTTERWORTH,
RUSSELL LARSEN,
JOE OLIVER, WILLIAM JAMES,
and ORSON D. SPENCER,
Pla.intiffs and Appellants,

Case
No. 9898

-vs.LINCOLN HANKS,
Defendant arnd Respondent.

Defendant and Respondent's
Answering Brief
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This action is brought for specific performance of an
alleged oral agreement to sell stock to the plaintiffs. The
applicable law is the statute of frauds of the State of
Colorado which holds that such an agreement is void.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The statements made by the plaintiff-appellants regarding the proceedings in the lower court are not
accurate.
1
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The pretrial judge, on October 18, 1962, framed the
issues in the case. At the pretrial counsel for defendant-respondent Hanks urged that the plaintiffs could
not recover as a matter of law because the alleged contract was void under Colorado law.
Counsel for plaintiff-appellants was not prepared to
present law on this point and the pretrial judge stated
that since it was then after 5:00 o'clock p.m., and the
matter was a complex one, the issues would be framed
and the matter could be brought before the court on a
motion for summary judgment or on further pretrial at
a later date.
On March 8, 1963, the matter was brought on for further pretrial (R. 19) and the pretrial judge called for
complete memorandums of the law with regard to the
statute of frauds issue which were prepared by both
counsel. (R. 41-44; R. 45-53; R. 56-62; R. 66-71; R. 72-80.)
On March 19, 1963, the pretrial judge granted defendant-respondent's motion for summary judgment on
the plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action relating to the
alleged oral agreement and ruled that even if said agreement was made as alleged by the plaintiff-appellants, it
would be void under Colorado law.
The pretrial judge did not overrule the prior pretrial order as stated at page 4 of plaintiff-appellants'
brief. The further pretrial was clearly a "Supplemental Pretrail" (R. 19) for the purpose of giving full
consideration to the defense of the statute of frauds
2
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raised by the defendant. Counsel for plaintiff-appellants
at no time objected to the further pretrial and was as
anxious to have the issue determined before trial as was
defendant-respondent's counsel until the court ruled
against him.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-respondent seeks a decision from this
court sustaining the ruling of the District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant-respondent, Lincoln Hanks, was employed to assist Life Assurance Company of the vV est, a
Colorado insurance company, in organizing a sales force
and assisting in the sale of an issue of stock to residents
of the State of Colorado.
The plaintiff-appellants were salesmen employed by
the insurance company to sell the stock. The salesmen
all executed contracts with the company under the terms
by which they were to receive 10% of the gross sales price
on all stock sold by them. A copy of said contract was
stipulated to and included in the record. (R. 63, 64)
At a subsequent time Hanks made an agreement with
the salesmen to contribute a sum equal to 2% of the
gross sales price of the stock sold by them if :
(a) They performed all terms of this agreement
with the company.
3
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(b) If they stayed to the end of the company's underwriting. (See copy of this agreement stipulated into
the record, R. 65.)
On April 22, 1961, several months after the plaintiffs
had made their agreements with the company and with
Hanks, the plaintiffs met in Denver, Colorado, at which
place a further agreement was made. The parties disagree as to the terms of this agreement. Plaintiff-appellants claim that at this meeting Hanks agreed to sell
them 6,666 shares of stock in the company at $.35 per
share and that this agreement was unconditional. Hanks
contends the offer was conditional on the men staying
with him on future underwritings for three years and that
the stock would be held in trust for three years and then
divided among those who performed this condition.
The parties, however, have stipulated, and the pretrial judge made it a part of the pretrial order, that the
agreement was, whatever its terms, made in Colorado.
"6. The parties further agree that on April
22, 1961, there was an oral agreement between the
plaintiffs and the defendant, which agreement
was made at Denver, Colorado." (R. 18)
The plaintiff-appellants further agreed, and the pretrial order provides, that the agreement, even under the
terms as plaintiff-appellants contend them to be, was not
to be performed sooner than thirteen months from the
date it was made.
"5. The parties further agree that the bonus
stock was not to be available for purchase by the
plaintiffs prior to May 21, 1962. '' (R. 18)
4
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The statement that Hanks accepted money from two
of the plaintiffs (Page 8, appellants' brief) is not true.
Those two men, as a preliminary to filing suit, tendered
the purchase price of one-eighth of the stock by delivering their checks to Hanks. Hanks did not accept this
tender and the checks were never cashed.
Prior to the end of the offering the plaintiff-appellants terminated their relationship with the defendantrespondent and elected to enter into new contracts with
the company which granted them the 5% which defendant-respondent Hanks was to receive under the terms
of his agreement.
Other of the facts set forth by plaintiff-appellants are
inaccurate but are of no consequence on this appeal since
the only question before the court is whether the agreement sued upon is within the Colorado statute of frauds.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE PRETRIAL JUDGE WAS CORRECT IN
RULING THAT THE AGREEMENT SUED
UPON, EVEN IF MADE AS ALLEGED, WAS
VOID SINCE IT WOULD VIOLATE THE
COLORADO STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
The alleged agreement sued upon is governed by the
law of the State of Colorado. Title 59-1-12 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953, makes such an agreement
void on two grounds. (1) That by the terms of the agree-

5
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ment it was not to be performed within one year from the
making thereof, and (2) That it is a contract for the sale
of a thing in action for the price of $50.00 or more.
The C_olorado statute governing this contract reads
as follows:
'' V orn AGREEMENTS. - In the following cases
every agreement shall be void, unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in
writing and subscribed by the party charged
therewith:
(1) Every agreement that by the terms is not
to be performed within one year from the making thereof ...
( 4) Every contract for the sale of any goods,
chattels, or things in action, for the price of fifty
dollars or more, shall be void, unless :
(a) A note or memorandum of such contract be made in writing, and be subscribed
by the parties to be charged therewith; or,
(b) Unless the buyer shall accept and receive part of such goods, or the evidence of
some of them, of such things in action ; or,
(c) Unless the buyer, at the time, shall
pay some part of the purchase money."
59-1-12 C.R.S., 1953.
It is well settled that shares of stock are '' ithin the
definition of "goods, chattels or things in action, ... "
7

"Under the English statute it is settled that
choses in action are not included within the terms
'goods, wares and merchandise.' This is true even
though the choses in action is evidenced by a tangible document, as a certificate of stock. In the
6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

United States, under statutes similar to the English, shares of stock are held to be included."
Williston on Sales, Sec. 67, p. 168. See also
Wooley v. Loose, 57 U. 336, 195 P. 908.
Plaintiff-appellants in their brief attempt to urge
that the rule announced in the controlling Colorado case,
Knoff v. Gra.ce, 76 Colo. 428, 190 P. 526, has been watered
down by subsequent Colorado cases and should not be
applied. They write: ''The Supreme Court of Colorado in not overruling Knoff v. Grace broke its force in
1924 with its decision in Moore v. Bernard, 22 P. 134 ... "
(Appellants ' Brief, page 11.)
The subsequent cases do not in any way modify or
''break the force'' of the Grace rule which has long been
and now is the law in Colorado. On the contrary, the
cases cited by plaintiff-appellants implement and apply
the Grace rule.
The plaintiff-appellants, while arguing under Point
II of their brief (page 12) that the alleged agreement
is one that by its terms can be performed within one year,
do not contend or present any authorities tending to
show that the agreement was not one for the sale of
goods, chattels or things in action for a price of fifty
dollars or more. The contract, therefore, is clearly within the Colorado statute of frauds on this basis alone.
The position taken by plaintiff-appellants must, therefore, fail unless there was such performance on their part
that the statute does not bar them from recovery.
The Colorado rule can be succinctly stated as follows :
Performance by the party seeking to enforce an
7
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agreement which otherwise would be within the statute
of fra.uds will avoid the statute of frauds on.ly if that
performance is inconsistent with acts which can be referable to any agreement or theory other than the one
sought to be enforced.

Some of the cases put the rule another way and say:
The performance of the pa.rty seeking to take the
contract out of the statute will only accomplish this if
the performance is solely referable to the contract
asserted.

Both rules are the same and if the Colorado cases
are carefully analyzed, it will be clear that there has
been no retreat from this rule which was announced in
Knoff v. Grace.
In Knoff v. Grace, 76 Colo. 428, 190 P. 526, the plaintiffs sued for specific performance of an oral lease for
three years on a grocery store. The plaintiffs had
changed their position substantially and performed under the oral lease in the following respects :
(a) Plaintiffs relying on the oral lease quit their
jobs to run the store.
(b) The plaintiffs formed a partnership and raised
capital to run the store at considerable expense to themselves.
(c) They remodeled the store and bought fixtures
which they installed in the store.

8
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(d) They completely stocked the store.
(e) They took complete possession of the store.
(f) They advertised and ran the store, developing
customers and good will at their expense.
(g) They paid rent to the defendant.
The trial court held that the three year agreement
relied upon by the defendants was void and the defendants were ejected. On appeal the Supreme Court \Yas
faced with a fact situation where it had every reason to
lean toward the defendants. The court, in sustaining
the trial court, made a keen analysis of the policy behind
the statute of frauds.
''The statute in question was passed for the
reason that it was not safe to let proof, upon the
questions therein referred to, rest in parol; it follows that to serve the purpose of the statute we
must take care never so to extend the exceptions
thereto, which are pressed upon us so constantly,
as to let those questions become issues to be tried
on oral testimony alone.
While it has often been truly said that equity
ought not to allow the statute of frauds to be used
as an instrument of fraud or wrong, yet the statute can never be enforced without some hardship
and wrong. Wherever there is an oral contract
on which a party has relied, it is, in some degree,
a wrong and hardship upon him to hold it invalid,
and if there is no oral contract there is no room
for the statute to act. Therefore the enforcement
of the statute must always be, in a sense (though,
of course, not in legal contemplation) a fraud or
9
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wrong upon him against whom it is enforced.''
Page 527.
The courts long ago faced the problem of whether
it is worse to risk a fraud on a defendant by plaintiffs
urging an oral contract or to place the burden on the one
making a contract to obtain a memorandum in "Titing.
Philosophical arguments can be made ad infinitum on
this question but the matter was wisely resolved by facing
the parties to an oral contract with the prospect of being
denied relief in the courts if they failed to obtain a sufficient writing.
The court in the Grace case next treated the contention of the defendant-appellants that their performance,
change of condition, and detriment should take the contrast out of the application of the statute and that the
application of the statute would seriously injure the defendants and aid the plaintiff in the perpetration of a
fraud upon the defendants while to enforce the contract
would not damage the plaintiff who would receive the
agreed rental for the three year term. To this the court
said:
"It is also the rule that what is done as part
performance must, to escape the statute, be consistent with no theory other than that of the alleged oral lease. What is fairly referrable to
some other cause than the contract as alleged will
not be regarded as sufficient part performance to
justify a decree of specific performance. Von
Trotha v. Bamberger, 15 Colo. 1, 24 P. 883; J enning v. Miller, 48 Ore. 201, 85 P. 517; Morrison v.
Herrick, 130 Ill. 631, 22 N.E. 537; Wood v. Thorn10
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by, 58 Ill. 468; Kosh v. Nat'l. Bldg. Ass'n., 137
Ill. 497, 27 N.E. 530.
The reason for this rule is that an act which
is consistent with some contract other than that
alleged does not tend to prove the latter.
For example, in the present case possession
and payment of rent are as consistent with a tenancy from month to month as with one of a year
or more. So the installation of trade fixtures is
consistent with a monthly tenancy, because the
tenant would be obliged to install them whatever
his tenancy ... The whole proof, therefore, is left
to oral testimony, which is what the statute seeks
to prevent.'' Page 528.
The rule stated by the Colorado Supreme Court in
the Grace case has not been overruled and is still the rule
of law in Colorado. Contrary to the statement made by
plaintiff-appellants in their brief (page 11) that the
force of this rule was "broken" in the case of Moore v.
Bernard, 226 P. 134 and In re Moschetti's Estate, 259 P.
515, these cases applied the formula of the Grace case.
In the Berna,rd case the plaintiff heir sued to reform
a deed conveying a life estate claiming an oral agreement
to convey the land to six heirs if they would pay $75.00/
month each during the life of the deceased. The six heirs
paid $450.00 per month during the life of the deceased
and thus fully performed their agreement and the performance met the test of the Grace rule because there
was no other agreement or theory which would explain
the payment of the $450.00 per month and hence the performance was wholly referrable to the oral contract
sought to be enforced.
11
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The second case In re Moschetti's Estale, 259 P. 515,
which plaintiff-appellants cite as "breaking the force"
of the Grace rule likewise follows the Grace rule and
applies it. In this case the plaintiffs sought to recover
three-fourths of the proceeds from the sale of a lease,
contending they had purchased the interest pursuant to
an oral sale. The performance they relied upon was :
(a) Payment by check of $1,500.00 for part of the
interest.
(b) Payment by check of three-fourths of all the
lease rentals.
(c) Reimbursement of three-fourths of the payments
made by Moschetti on the mine.
(d) Purchase of equipment for the mine.
None of this performance was referrable to any other
contract but the purchase agreement sought to be enforced and hence under the Grace rule this performance
avoided the statute of frauds and the court correctly
applied the Gra,ce rule and did not "break its force" as
plaintiff-appellants state in their brief.
The Colorado case of Rupp v. Hill, 367 P. 2d 746,
cited at page 11 of plaintiff-appellants' brief to demonstrate a softening of the Grace rule, does not modify the
rule in any way, but strictly applies it. In the Hill case
the plaintiff Rupp sought to enforce an oral agreement
made with his co-tenant Hill to sell the plaintiff his onehalf interest in the co-tenancy for the amount of his in12
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vestment, plus 10% interest. There was part performance by the plaintiff as follows :
(a) Rupp continued in possession of the ranch with
his family and made improvements at his own expense.
(b) The Hills abandoned property to Rupp and
never returned to the ranch.
(c) A release for Hill was obtained by Rupp of any
liability arising out of a sales contract on the ranch which
both Rupp and Hill were parties to. (This was one of the
conditions imposed by Hill in the Rupp-Hill oral contract.)
The trial court held that the contract was void under
the statute of frauds and Hill appealed. The Supreme
Court, in reversing the trial court, held :
1. That an agreement to reduce to writing an oral
agreement within the statute of frauds is unenforceable
as is the agreement itself since to enforce such an agreement would make a void contract indirectly enforceable.
2. The trial court failed to consider whether or not
the partial performance by Rupp was referrable to the
oral contract sought to be enforced. The court was careful in sending the case back for further proceedings to
restate the Grace rule:
''If there was a parol agreement, does possession of the property by Rupp and his family
make inapplicable the statute of frauds~ It de-

13
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pends upon. whether such possession is referable
to the agreement.
Actual possession in furtherance of an oral
contract may be made the foundation for a decree of specific performance, btd such possession
must be referrable to the contract, Von Trotha v.
Bamberger, 15 Colo. 1, 24 P. 883; 3 American Law
of Property 31, Sec. 11.8; Whether possession is
referrable to the contract rests upon circumstances, and should be resolved by the trier of the
facts." Page 749. (Emphasis supplied)
The court then remanded the case for the trial court
to determine if the possession of Rupp, the improvements
made on the property by Rupp, and the obtaining of the
release for Hill were acts of performance that are referrable to the contract sought to be enforced as to some
other agreement or theory. This is a strict application
of the Grace rule. If these acts were shown on the record
on appeal to be referrable to any other theory or contract, as the acts of the plaintiff-appellants are in this
case, then the court would have sustained the District
Court instead of remanding it for a determination of this
lSSUe.

In our case the acts relied upon by the plaintiff-appellants as constituting partial performance are referrable to both the contract with Life Assurance Company of the West and the 2% bonus agreement with
Hanks.
The case of Bushn.er v. Bushner, 307 P. 2d 204, cited
at page 11 of plaintiff-appellants' brief, also applies the
Grace rule and does not aid the plaintiff-appellants. In
14
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that case the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
ruling, denying specific performance of an oral agreement to hold property in trust for the plaintiff and to
re-convey on demand. This decision was primarily based
on the fact that the defendant was a trustee of the property, had no ownership at all in it, and was using the
statute of frauds as a defense to his cestiui que trust's
demand for turnover of the trust property. In addition,
however the acts of performance between the parties
could not be referred to any other contract or theory
other than the oral trust agreement.

POINT II
THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT BY ITS EXPRESS TERMS WAS NOT TO BE PERFORMED BY EITHER PARTY EARLIER
THAN THIRTEEN MONTHS FROM THE
~IAKING OF THE AGREEMENT. THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT, THEREFORE, IS
WITHIN THE COLORADO STATUTE OF
FRAUDS FOR THIS REASON AND FOR THE
FURTHER REASON THAT IT IS AN ORAL
AGREEMENT FOR THE SALE OF A" THING
IN ACTION, FOR THE PRICE OF $50.00 OR
MORE."
Appellant's contention in Point II that supposed
full performance of the alleged contract within one year
by the plaintiffs establishes this alleged contract as not
within the statute of frauds, is erroneous on three
grounds.
First, the pretrial stipulations establish the fact that
no contract was ever entered into between the parties
15
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for the sale of stock, and even if a contract did exist,
that full performance by any party was impossible for at
least thirteen months from the date of contract. The
alleged contract required the plaintiffs to perform two
acts: (1) remain as salesmen until the completion of
the public offering, and (2) to render payment for the
stock. Although the first act was capable of performance within a one year period, the second act, payment,
was expressly conditioned by the alleged contract as not
to be performed for at least thirteen months from the contract date, for the stock was "not to be available for purchase by the plaintiffs prior to May 21, 1962, ... '' (R. 18)
yet the alleged contract date was April of 1961. Thus,
according to the express agreement, the plaintiffs could
not fully perform within a one year period. To say that
they had the means and made any attempt to tender payment within a year's period only begs the question. An
express condition of the agreement ·was that no purchase
could be made for at least thirteen months from the date
of the alleged contract. Again none of the cases relied
upon by the plaintiff-appellants are on point, for in none
of those cases is there a situation where the parties have
expressly agreed between themselves that some condition of the contract will not be performed for at least a
year.
Even if any attempt at payment by the plaintiffappellants were to be considered, the Colorado statute
provides that part payment will remove a contract for
the sale of ''things in action'' from within the statute,
only when such payment is made "at the time" of the
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purchase. Colo. Rev. State. 59-1-12(4c). No payment
was made at the time of this alleged contract. Two of
the eight plaintiffs tendered payment on March 6, 1962,
almost a year after the alleged agreement of April 22,
1961.
Plaintiff-appellants' contention that the defendantrespondent himself could have performed within a year's
period again begs the express conditions of the contract
and also ignores the defendant-respondent's express
agreement with Mr. Stewart not to resell the stock before May 21, 1962.
Secondly, assuming the existence of a contract, plaintiff-appellants' claim of removal from the statute of
frauds by full performance in completing the sale of
the public offering within one year flies in the face of
established Colorado and generally accepted law. This
rule is stated in Knoff v. Grace, 68 Colo. 527, 190 P. 526,
528, as follows :
"What is done as part performance must, to
escape the statute, be consistent with no theory
other than that of the alleged oral contract. What
is fairly referable to some other cause than the
contract as alleged will not be regarded as sufficient part performance to justify a decree of specific performance.'' See also, Silver v. Investment
Securities Co., Ltd., 244 P. 2d 877 and French v.
Mitchell, 22 P. 2d 644.
Plaintiff-appellants remaining as salesmen until the
completion of the public offering is not exclusively referrable to the alleged contract, as required by the Colo-
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rado rule. This conduct is directly attributable to two
other agreements; namely to the plaintiff-appellants' employment agreement with Life Insurance Company of
the \Vest, and to the plaintiff-appellants' agreement with
the defendant-respondent under the terms of which the
plaintiff-appellants were to receive 2% of the gross sales
in the event they stayed until the end of the public offering and performed certain other terms. If the court permits this performance to take the contract out of the
statute of frauds, where this performance is consistent
with other contracts than the oral contract sought to be
shown, then the statute of frauds is defeated entirely
because the plaintiff-appellants, already having obligations of performance, may fraudulently assert an oral
contract by setting up the performance they are already
obliged to give as the performance of the fraudulent contract. The case of Enos v. Anderson, 40 Colo. 395, 93 P.
475, cited by the plaintiff-appellants in their brief which
decision permitted the showing of the oral contract where
full performance was rendered is not precedent for this
case, for in that case the performance relied upon was not
referable to any other contract but was exclusively referable to the oral agreement sought to be enforced. This
is the proper application of the Grace rule.
Thirdly, in attempting to avoid the statute of frauds
the plaintiff-appellants haYe entirely ignored Sec.
59-1-12( 4) of the Colo. Rev. Stat. (1953), which provides:
"In the following cases e'i·ery agreement shall
be void, unless such agreement, or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing ...
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( 4) Every contract for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, for the price of fifty dollars or more .... ''
Stock is a "thing in action" within the meaning of
this type statute. Wooley v. Loose, 57 U. 336, 194 P. 908,
Willies ton on Sales, Sec. 67, page 168.
The instant case clearly falls, not only within the
statutory provision relating to agreements not to he performed within one year, but also within the above provision voiding from the beginning alleged oral agreements
purporting to convey "things in action" with value in
excess of fifty dollars. Since plaintiff-appellants' make
no attempt to avoid this section and since it clearly applies in the present case, on this basis alone defendantrespondent is entitled to affirmation of his judgment.
POINT III
THE CONTENTION OF THE PLAINTIFFAPPELLANTS THAT THE WRITTEN MEMORANDUM RELATING TO THE 2% BONUS
COMMISSION REMOVES THE TRANSACTION FROM THE EFFECT OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS UNTENABLE BECAUSE
THE MEMORANDUM FAILS TO MEET THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE COLORADO LAW.
Plaintiff-appellants under Point III of their brief
(page 14) propound a theory which has never before
been urged at any stage of the proceedings or in the
pleadings. i. e., That the memorandum delivered by Hanks
to the plaintiff-appellants spelling out the agreement with
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reference to the 2% bonus comnnsswn is in reality a
memorandum covering the entire compensation agreement between the parties including the oral agreements
with reference to the stock which they allege were made
and which they are seeking to enforce.
This theory and argument must fail because a memorandum to satisfy the statute of frauds must, among
other requirements, contain all of the essential terms of
the agreement, including a description of the property
to which the agreement relates and the consideration to
be paid and the terms of payment of such consideration.
A memorandum which fails to contain all of the principal
terms of the oral contract sought to be enforced is insufficient and does not relieve the oral contract from the
effect of the statute of frauds. The Restatement of
Contracts sets forth this rule as follows :
"TOPIC 7. SUFFICIENCY OF A MEMORANDUM.
Sec. 207. General Requisites of a Memorandum.
A memorandum, in order to make enforceable a
contract within the Statute, may be any document or writing, formal or informal, signed by the
party to be charged or by his agent actually or
apparently authorized thereunto, which states
with reasonable certainty,
(a) each party to the contract either bY his
own name, or by such a description a~ will
serve to identify him, or by the name or
description of his agent, and
(b) the land, goods or other subject-matter to
which the contract relates, and
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(c) the terms and conditions of all the promises constituting the contract and by whom
and to whom the promises are made."
It is obvious that if the courts permitted a memorandum to serve as evidence of a contract where the
terms of the contract are not set out or referred to in
the memorandum as in this case, the statute of frauds
would have no effectiveness at all. Any person seeking
to enforce a fraudulent contract who had another contract with the same person could simply say that the

written contract was a memorandum of a transaction
involving an additional contract agreed to orally.

The

courts do not permit the use of such a memorandum to
avoid the effect of the statute of frauds. Williston defines
what a memorandum must contain in order to be sufficient
for purposes of avoiding the statute of frauds.
''The property to which a sale, or contract to
sell, relates must be described in the memorandum
with reasonable certainty. So, although the contract appearing in the memorandum seems to be
complete upon its face, if, in fact, there are additional terms, the memorandum is insufficient because the memorandum must state the essential
terms of the oral contract.'' Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Sec. 575, page 1645.
The Colorado Supreme Court announced the rule set
forth in the Restatement and Williston in 1883 in the case
of Eppich v. Clifford, 6 Colo. 493. This case set forth four
requirements that must be met by a memorandum seeking
to avoid the effect of the statute of frauds and held that
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the failure to meet anyone of these requirements was
fatal to the memorandum.

''It has been held under a similar statute that
the note or memorandum must show on its face,
or by reference to other writings, first, the names
of the parties, vendor and vendee ; second, the
terms and conditions of the contract; third, the
interest or property affected; and fourth, the consideration to be paid therefore . . . Failing in
either of these requirements it is fatally defective.'' Eppich v. Clifford, 6 Colo. 493, pages 494
and 495.
The 2% contract which the plaintiff-appellants urge
in their brief as the memorandum of the agreement for
the sale of stock fails to meet the requirements of the
Colorado law in the following particulars: (1) It does
not describe the stock or even refer to the stock. (2) It
does not contain any of the terms and conditions of the
alleged contract for the sale of the stock. (3) It does
not set forth the consideration to be paid for the stock
or the terms of payment.
The memorandum, therefore, only meets one of the
four requirements and is, therefore, in the words of the
Colorado Supreme Court, "fatally defective."
POINT IV.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS ARE PRECLUDED FROM CONTENDING ON APPEAL THAT
THE CONTRACT SOUGHT TO BE ENFORCED IS NOT A COLORADO CONTRACT,
HAVING STIPULATED AT PRETRIAL TO
THIS FACT.
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..... ~

At the pretrial hearing of the above entitled case
the parties stipulated that the agreement sought to be
enforced under the Second Cause of Action of the plaintiff-appellants' complaint was made in Colorado:
'' 6. The parties further agree that on April
22, 1961, there was an oral agreement between the
plaintiffs and the defendant, which agreement was
made at Denver, Colorado." (R. 18.)
The question of which state law governed with reference to the alleged agreement sought to be enforced by
the plaintiff-appellants was considered at length at the
pretrial and both parties stipulated that the contract was
made in Colorado and the Colorado law, therefore, would
apply. It is too late for the plaintiff-appellants, having
thus stipulated and agreed to this pretrial issue, to attempt to assert that some other law is controlling in order
to avoid the rule of law adopted by the Supreme Court of
Colorado. The Utah cases cited under Point IV of plaintiff-appellants' brief, therefore, do not apply and should
not be considered in the determination of the issues
raised on this appeal.
POINT V
THERE IS NO THIRD PARTY AGREEMENT
WHICH COULD ENTITLE THE APPELLANTS TO RELIEF. THE AGREEl\IENT ALLEGED WOULD BE VOID FOR INDEFINITENESS IN ANY EVENT AND WOULD BE
VOID ON THE FURTHER GROUND THAT IT
VIOLATES THE COLORADO STATUTE OF
FRAUDS.
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Plaintliff-appellants' contention in Point V that they
are third-party beneficiaries to the contract between
Mr. Stewart and defendant-respondent, hereafter referred to as the supporting contract, providing for the
acquisition of stock by the defendant-respondent, is erroneous on two grounds.
First, the record clearly shows that no semble nee of
a third-party beneficiary situation existed. Persons who
are recognized as having enforceable rights created in
them by a contract to which they are not parties and for
which they give no consideration, must qualify as either
a creditor or a donee beneficiary before such rights are
enforceable. The plaintiff-appellants fail to qualify as
creditor (obligee) beneficiaries, for there is no showing
in the record of an obligation or duty owed by either the
defendant-respondent or Mr. Stewart to the plaintiffappellants, for which obligation or duty the supporting
contract was supposedly entered into to discharge. For
a donee beneficiary situation to exist which would be enforceable against the defendant-respondent, the following situation would have to exist. l\1r. Stewart would
have to be the donor, intending to carry out his donative
intent through the defendant-respondent. Then if the
defendant-respondent failed to deliver the donated stock,
the plaintiff-appellants might effect recourse against the
defendant-respondent. See, 4 Corbin, Contracts, 1951,
Sec. 774-76. But such is not the present case. There
was no donative intent manifested by Mr. Stewart
towards the plaintiff-appellants. l\Ir. Stewart sold the
stock to the defendant-respondent for consideration,
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thirty-five cents per share. The record only shows, contradictory to plaintiff-appellants' claim in their brief,
that at the time the supporting contract was being consummated, the defendant-respondent, and not Mr. Stewart, merely stated that one of his purposes for purchasing
the stock was to keep his men happy. (R. 351, p. 3, 4,
Interrogatories 10-15.) If plaintiff-appellants can make
anything of this fact situation it is only that the defend·
ant-respondent declared his intention to a third party
to make an inter-vivos gift, or to at some future time
enter into some kind of a contractual arrangement with
the plaintiff-appellants to transfer stock to them. If
this was a declaration of intent to make an inter-vivos gift,
then the law clearly is that such is not enforceable. Promises to make gifts are not enforceable until the subject, or
some token thereof, is given into the possession of the
donee. Johnson v. Hilliard, (1945) 113 Colo. 548, 160 P.
2d 386. Such was never done here. If this is construed
as a manifestation by the defendant-respondent of an
intent to enter into a contractual relationship with the
plaintiff-appellants at some future time, then that contract must be looked to, and as discussed earlier, plaintiffappellants' allegation of such a contract is negated by
reason of the statute of frauds.
Certainly no contract between the parties to this action of either the third-party or direct contractual nature, can be conjured up by reference to this simple manifestation of intent to keep his men happy. Even if any
kind of a contract were found, such would fail because
of its indefiniteness. The plaintiff-appellants were un-
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aware, at the time of this statement, of the defendant-respondent's intent. Further, there are no conditions or
duties to be performed, set out or even a price to be paid
for the stock stipulated. See Wilhelm Lubrication Co. Y.
Brattrud (1936) 197 Minn. 626, 268 N.W. 634.
Second, this third-party agreement in no way Circumvents the statute of frauds provisions that, as previously discussed, are controlling in this case.

The

"chose in action" (stock) which is the subject matter
of the questioned transaction had a value in excess of
fifty dollars, thus requiring: (1) a ·signed writing, or (2)
reception of part of the goods by the buyer, or (3) part
payment "at the time" of the purchase, to remove this
alleged agreement from the statute.

Colo. Stat. Rev.

1953, Sec. 59-1-12 ( 4a-c).
"It is perfectly obvious that third parties have
no enforceable contractual rights if there is no
contract.'' 4 Corbin, Contracts, 1951, Sec. 773.

POINT VI.
NO GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT EXISTS AS
URGED UNDER POINT VI OF PLAINTIFFAPPELLANTS' BRIEF.
Under Point VI of plaintiff-appellants' brief (page
18) plaintiff-appellants argue that Hanks promised to
write a letter spelling out the terms of the agreement
relating to the stock and says that by reason of this issues
of fact exists.
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Even if we should concede that Hanks did so promise, it is difficult to see how this would raise any issue
of fact. Such a promise, if made, would be clearly void
under the Colorado statute of frauds. The Colorado Supreme Court so held in the case of Rupp v. Hill, 367 P.
2d 746:
''But on the simple question now being considered, the vast majority of cases hold that a parol
agreement to reduce to writing a contract which
is within the statute of frauds is unenforceable.
A contract that is unenforceable by reason of the
statute cannot be made indirectly enforceable by
promising to execute a sufficient memorandum or
otherwise to satisfy the requirements of the
statute. 2 Corbin on Contracts 31, Sec. 283.''
Rupp v. Hill, 367 P. 2d 746, 749.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff-appellants, in their effort to avoid the
application of the statute of frauds to the alleged agreement which they are seeking to enforce, have resorted to
untenable theories and to authorities which do not support their position to the slightest extent. The only authority properly cited is Aesop's Fable (plaintiff-appellants' brief, page 20). The facts of the fable are correct, but the parties have been confused. The plaintiffappellants are the foxes who, having obtained everything
they bargained for, seek by fraud to secure additional
compensation.
The law of Colorado clearly holds that the purported
agreement would be void even if it was made as they
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allege. If the plaintiff-appellants had truly made an
agreement, the burden was upon them to obtain a written
memorandum as is required by the law of Colorado.
Respectfully submitted,
McBROOM & HYDE
401 El Paso Natural Gas Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent
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